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Abstract. Many studies discuss the economic and techni-
cal aspects of flood warnings. Less attention has been given
to the social and behavioural patterns that affect alert ser-
vices. In particular, the literature focuses on warnings acti-
vated in river basins or marine environments without pro-
viding clear evidence on Mediterranean coastal areas, even
though these are subjected to growing flood risk related to
climate change. This paper is a first attempt to bridge this
gap. Our research develops an in-depth analysis of the village
of Cesenatico on the Adriatic Sea coast. Here the municipal-
ity adopted two complementary warning systems: a siren and
an alert via short message service (SMS). The analysis fo-
cuses on a survey conducted in 2011 and 2012 with 228 par-
ticipants. The relationships between social and behavioural
variables and warning services are investigated as well as
flood preparedness and information dissemination. Qualita-
tive evidence from informal interviews is used to support the
understanding of key responses. The conclusions show how
different social and behavioural patterns can influence the
effectiveness and use of warning systems, regardless of the
technology adopted and the structural mitigation measures
implemented. Education, training and accountability are seen
to be critical elements for implementation. Finally, the statis-
tical output is used to suggest new questions and new direc-
tions for research.
1 Introduction
Anyone committed to the creation of a safer society knows
how critical the challenge represented by floods is. In 2012,
they resulted in 53 % of all disaster victims (the sum of deaths
and total affected people) and represented 6 out of the 10
worst events in the same category. For example, the flood that
struck China in June 2012 caused 17.4 million victims alone
(Guha-Sapir et al., 2013). Increasing pressure on the envi-
ronment and the possible effects of climate change further
highlighted the need for innovative mitigation and resilience
strategies. In particular, warning plays a crucial role in the
disaster cycle as one of the means of reducing the effects of
hazards. It can be defined as risk communication about an
imminent event that is intended to produce appropriate re-
actions in citizens (Lindell et al., 2007). Intuitively, anyone
can think of a large number of situations in which the pres-
ence of an alert could make the difference between life and
death. This is particularly true for floods. According to the
Encyclopedia of Natural Hazards (2012), “a natural warn-
ing system is usually technology based, monitors signs of a
natural hazard, evaluates the signs against rules and notifies
people, triggering a human response” (Leonard et al., 2012,
p. 1091). However, they have to be contextualized to be effec-
tive. Alexander (1993, p. 400) noted that the creation and im-
plementation of warnings “involves the complex interactions
between physical, technological and social systems whose
operation must be carefully coordinated in order to achieve a
satisfactory result.”
Flood warnings are based not only on technical elements
(the technology used for forecasting and monitoring haz-
ards or the solutions used to disseminate advice) but also on
the community, which receives and responds to them. Many
studies, such as that by Tapsell (2010), show that flood warn-
ings orientate individual actions during the preparedness and
response phases. Timely, focused and widespread warnings
can determine both the effectiveness of mass-response mea-
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sures, such as evacuation plans, and the adoption of indi-
vidual measures, such as safety measures in households. If
these are inadequate, they can increase the perceived impacts
of flooding in groups in which communication is lacking
(Penning-Rowsell and Tapsell, 2002), while the same poor
performances also exacerbate the intangible impact of floods
(Penning-Rowsell et al., 2000). Even if those points seem to
be self-evident, for many years flood policies concentrated
on structural mitigation measures, such as the construction
of dikes and other physical barriers.
The definitive adoption of flood risk management, which
includes an emphasis on non-structural elements, has oc-
curred only since the early 1990s. This period saw the de-
velopment of a mix of mitigation measures that increasingly
used behavioural approaches to reduce human vulnerabil-
ity to floods but, for a long time, maintained a top-down
approach. In the past, emphasis on technological solutions
for monitoring river or sea levels has generally not been fol-
lowed by the development of appropriate warning dissemina-
tion strategies (Gruntfest, 2000). Similarly, 1697 interviews
conducted after the 2002 floods with private residents located
in the River Elbe and Danube catchments showed that more
than a quarter of the people did not receive any warning at
all. Flood warning given by the authorities reached 41 % of
people interviewed, but 33 % of citizens became aware of
flooding through their own observations, while personal net-
works (friends, neighbours and relatives) contributed 13 %.
The advice given by nationwide news broadcasts contributed
only 14 % (Thieken et al., 2007). Smith and Petley (2009) ob-
served similar patterns during the June 2007 flooding in the
UK: many problems occurred in south and east Yorkshire, in
particular at Sheffield, Doncaster and Hull, where residents
were unprepared and failed to receive appropriate warnings.
This could be framed in what Handmer (2001) defined as “a
failure in the conceptualization of the warning task”, where
agencies acquired an authoritarian position rather than recog-
nizing that floods are “owned” by the communities in which
they occur. According to this view, warnings remain more
a function of relief services than an artefact of the long-
term empowerment of communities. Different levels of gov-
ernance were often in conflict, which reduced the opportuni-
ties for co-operative action.
Although the situation seems to have changed slightly
in recent years, quantitative and qualitative research carried
out in Finland, Ireland, Italy and Scotland by O’Sullivan
et al. (2012) has demonstrated that many problems still re-
main. Low levels of the understanding of terminology on
flood magnitude were perceived as cross-national patterns,
while communication usually failed to channel direct, brief
and focused messages. Nevertheless, improvements in the
general framework of warning processes seem to be possi-
ble. Parker and Priest (2012) noted that in many European
countries, concrete steps have been taken to increase the ac-
cessibility of information and to differentiate communication
channels. Traditional instruments, in which agencies directly
release and disseminate warnings through face-to-face ad-
vice or sirens, have been implemented and integrated with
modern communication and information technologies. New
forms of “pull” warnings have been activated and are based
on the active role of citizens, for example by accessing online
instruments (web pages) or through a request to the provider
by a telephone call. However, is this true everywhere, and
how do different systems interact with each other from a so-
cial and behavioural perspective?
The current state of European flood warnings is mostly
based on evidence derived from the United Kingdom and
by Germany. The majority of the literature analysed flood
warnings at large, with references to both riverine and coastal
flooding, for example in official reports by the UK ministry
DEFRA (Fielding et al., 2007). A large number of studies re-
ferred directly to river floods, but for the Mediterranean area
it was not possible to find systematic evidence that included
a cross-cutting analysis of demographic factors, local experi-
ences, public perceptions of information levels, risk informa-
tion, data on damage and how all of these influence specific
warning systems. On the one hand, there are interesting stud-
ies, such as the one by Lara et al. (2010), that widely analyse
social perceptions of floods but that do not include specific
analyses of warning services. On the other hand, technical
elements of warnings, such as those related to organization
or monitoring, often prevail in literature.
Llasat and Siccardi (2010) proposed a means of integrating
the social and technological aspects and increasing the effec-
tiveness of flood risk management. These authors argued that
for a modern civil protection service, a particular challenge
is how to improve the reliability of warning systems, which
in the Mediterranean can still be affected by technological
uncertainties inherent in the forecasting and prediction pro-
cesses. Thus, many questions are still open and cannot be sat-
isfied by a straightforward review of literature. Three points
are central to our work:
– In coastal area subject to recurring flooding, how can so-
cial and behavioural patterns orientate the effectiveness
of specific warning instruments?
– Can a warning system be perceived as useful from the
technical point of view but lose its potential if the social
dimension is missing?
– Is there any difference between the dynamics of the sit-
uation in the Mediterranean and those reported in the
literature?
In order to make use of a broad range of data, we carried out
an in-depth analysis of the village of Cesenatico on the north-
ern Italian Adriatic coast: the region was subject to increased
surge frequency and an early warning system was recently
implemented by MICORE project (Ciavola et al., 2011). In
particular, the site of Cesenatico was distinguished by a well-
known history of flooding, diffuse perception of flood risk
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Figure 1. Location of Cesenatico on the coast of Emilia–Romagna
and its position in Italy. The yellow points represent the three
biggest cities in the area, while the white ones highlight some of
the other large municipalities nearby (source: our elaboration from
Open Street Map).
and the presence of two complementary warning systems,
namely a siren and an alert via short message service (SMS)
that sent notifications when the siren was activated.
2 Description of Cesenatico and local flood risk
Cesenatico is an important tourist destination near the cities
of Rimini and Ravenna (Fig. 1). It is well known for its
sandy beaches and the attractiveness of its recreational ac-
tivities. According to official statistics issued by the Ital-
ian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) and the Regional
Government of Emilia–Romagna, in 2013 the municipal-
ity of Cesenatico had 25 686 inhabitants (12 433 males and
13 253 females), of which 4212 were under 18 years old
(16 %), 16 029 were between 18 and 64 years old (62 %)
and 5445 were over 65 years old (21 %). The mean age was
43.8 years. According to the detailed demographic and res-
idential profile, the residents of the main town, excluding
hamlets, numbered 10 116. However, this refers to the 2001
official population census and 2011 data are still under devel-
opment by ISTAT. In economic terms, tourism is the main-
stay of Cesenatico. As the provincial administration of Forlì-
Cesena (2013) noted, there is an average of 474 582 arrivals
per year and average stay of 8 days each. The region in which
Cesenatico lies is distinguished by the highest social capital
in Italy and in the past had been taken as a reference for the
Figure 2. Map of Cesenatico. We highlighted the location of the
Porto Canale, the municipality and the key emergency actors (civil
protection and fire fighters). Furthermore, we included the location
of some of the structural defences and sand nourishments (source:
our elaboration from Open Street Map).
relationship between good governance and democracy (Put-
nam et al., 1993). Local social capital includes some of the
highest numbers of sport societies and their members per
1000 inhabitants but a slightly lower value of participation in
blood donation drives and the lowest number of newspapers
per 1000 citizens in the region (Cartocci, 2007). Voter activ-
ity in the 2011 municipal elections was 72.72 %, in line with
average figures for the Emilia–Romagna region (71.5 %) and
slightly higher than the national value (68.3 %). From this
overview, what emerges is a strong and active community,
in which relationships matter but voluntary activities may be
somewhat limited. The lower rate of diffusion of newspapers
may imply that traditional sources of information, and asso-
ciated channels of dissemination, do not have a strong hold
on this area.
The coastline of Cesenatico is approximately 7 km long
and is divided by harbour jetties and defences into a north-
ern and southern area (Fig. 2). In the last 50 years, the
northern areas known as Cesenatico Ponente and Cesenatico
Colonie have been subject to strong erosion that gradually
consumed the beach that separates the sea from coastal build-
ings (Regione Emilia Romagna, 2011a). Indeed, Martinelli
et al. (2010) pointed out that the municipality is part of a
strongly urbanized littoral where a general erosive tendency
can be associated with the reduced sediment transport rates
of the rivers and the increased anthropogenic subsidence. Ac-
cording to the same authors, the building of tourism facilities
contributed as well to the alteration of the beach equilibrium.
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The flood history of Cesenatico differs from that of the
areas in which most studies have been focused, such as the
coasts and rivers of England. Early attempts to protect the
harbour against floods date to 1502 AD. At the time, silta-
tion was a constant problem, and none other than Leonardo
Da Vinci planned a solution. He modified the orientation and
length of palings, extended the adjacent basin and regulated
the water flow with a system of mobile bulkheads system
called Porte Vinciane. Similarly, his plans were used to cre-
ate Porto Canale, a main water canal that divides the city
centre and is still used as a harbour. Nowadays, the munic-
ipality is subject to a growing flooding risk related to the
dynamics of climate change, urban development and techni-
cal problems of water basin management. When bad weather
occurs in conjunction with sea surges channels are likely to
overflow despite the technical solutions adopted. Armaroli et
al. (2012) recorded 27 extreme marine events that hit the re-
gional coast between 1966 and 2008. The storms were mostly
associated with high surge levels and were typical of the win-
ter period. They caused widespread damage such as inunda-
tion of the backshore, strong beach erosion and destruction or
damage to properties. A peak in damage was related to canal
and harbour overflow within the municipality of Cesenatico
(Perini et al., 2011). In the last 20 years the main events re-
coded in Cesenatico occurred in 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2004
(Perini et al., 2011). The flood of 1996 was the first emer-
gency mobilization for the local group of civil protection vol-
unteers (Radio Soccorso Cesenatico), which was established
only a few years before. In early 2011, about 1000 people
were involved and nearly 400 buildings were damaged (Il
Giornale della Protezione Civile, 2011). Many minor events
have been recurrent in local history, but a full list is not pre-
sented in this paper. However, it can be pointed out that local
floods are distinguished by economic and structural damages
rather than loss of life, which is relatively rare.
Since 1978, a large number of modifications have sought
to ensure the safety of the coast but without satisfactory
results. The official documentation by Regione Emilia Ro-
magna (2011b) explained this process: the measures included
Longard pipes, submerged sandbag barriers, beach nourish-
ment and rock panels. During the 1980s and 1990s, around
800 m of coastline near the bathing establishments was main-
tained with repeated beach nourishment, followed by other
cases of beach nourishment in the northern area known as
the Zona delle Colonie until this activity ceased at the end of
the 1990s. A major defence of emerged shores from the har-
bour of Rimini to that of Cesenatico was completed in 1997.
This measure has had particular collateral effects, as it in-
tercepts most sediment along the coast: it has recently been
understood that in the future, through its effects, the beach
of north Cesenatico will be maintained only with artificial
relocation of sand. Finally, a new parallel cliff barrier was
built in the year 2000 to protect the bathing establishments
(Regione Emilia Romagna, 2011b). In the most recent years,
new harbour gates have been built to protect Porto Canale,
but many technical problems have occurred and reduced their
effectiveness. In addition, the authorities have increased the
monitoring of Porto Canale and provided local civil protec-
tion services with real-time information. Two different warn-
ing systems have been adopted: a siren, located in the Porto
Canale area, and warning advice sent by SMS. The SMS is
a free service based on voluntary registration. It is triggered
when the siren is activated and is therefore complementary to
the latter. It is important to note that some groups of citizens
have the duty to call other people when they hear the siren.
3 Methodological background
The methodology adopted is mainly quantitative, but a quali-
tative approach was used to support the data set by providing
a wider interpretation of its social context. The study is based
on a five-page questionnaire distributed in Cesenatico during
March 2011 (after the flood of that year) and May 2012. It
aimed to explore the local perceptions of risk and prepara-
tion, to allow in-depth analysis of different features such as
the cultural setting and to probe the experience of the com-
munity and the personal history of individuals. It included
specific questions on warnings and required nearly 15 min to
be completed. Two core sections sought to obtain fundamen-
tal data on warnings, as follows:
1. Respondents were asked to provide their level of pre-
paredness according to a 10-item Likert scale. Specific
statements to be responded included the perception of
information about flood risk in Cesenatico (1 = not in-
formed at all, 10= extremely well informed); declara-
tion of preparedness level for surviving a flood in Ce-
senatico (1= not prepared at all, 10= extremely well
prepared); perception of capacity for self-protection
(1= not able at all, 10= extremely able); knowledge of
the mobile alert service created by the municipality (yes
or no); and its perceived utility (1= not useful at all,
10= very useful). The questionnaire finally asked how
many times the flood alert siren was heard and the re-
spondents’ reactions upon hearing it.
2. Past experience of flooding was enquired by questions
with scaled answers that ranged from 1 to 10. They fo-
cused on financial damage caused by previous flooding
(1= no financial damage, 10= considerable damages);
on how much ordinary life had been disrupted (1= no
disruption at all, 10= considerable disruption); and the
perceived effectiveness of emergency responses by the
Port Authority, fire fighters, civil protection, the munic-
ipality and the emergency medical services (1= not ef-
fective at all, 10= completely effective).
Participants were recruited in the Porto Canale area, or in
its immediate proximity, with direct contact in the streets,
at the seaside or in the shops according to the methodologi-
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cal features of “intercept interviews”. This method was cho-
sen because of observed local behaviour, where face-to-face
contact and dialogue is more likely to produce effective col-
laboration with the research than would phone interviews or
online questionnaires. In particular, the Porto Canale area
is considered a distinctive feature of Cesenatico, a spatial
“node” where all the cultural, community and geographical
patterns interact with each other. On the one hand, institu-
tions such as the municipality and associations such as Con-
fesercenti (the national association of businesses) have their
offices there. On the other hand, the area is characterized by
the diffuse presence of commercial activities such as shops,
restaurants and bars, but it is also subject to recurring floods.
A random sampling strategy targeting subjects who meet the
following parameters was applied to ensure that everyone has
the same probability of being selected (Phillips, 2014):
1. Residents or regular workers in Cesenatico: this limita-
tion was needed in order to ensure an effective percep-
tion of risk and its countermeasures while assuring that
the respondents were likely to have had local experience
of flooding.
2. Over 18 years old: this element referred to the legal age
of maturity in Italy and to full, independent involvement
in the rights and responsibilities of citizenship.
A mixed-mode approach was used to integrate paper-based
questionnaires and face-to face interviews (De Leeuw, 2005).
Data were collected and the overall methodology was de-
veloped according to the criteria for quantitative procedures
(Tabachnick and Fidell-Allyn, 2006). Specific statistical tests
were performed to obtain coherent and replicable results.
Data sets were checked to find out which tests were adequate
and which assumptions could be satisfied. Since data were
not normally distributed, non-parametric tests were selected
either to explore relationships among categorical and con-
tinuous variables (Spearman’s rank-order correlation, chi-
square test for independence) or to compare groups (Mann–
Whitney U test, Kruskal–Wallis test). Where appropriate,
post-hoc analysis was performed to deepen the statistical
significant differences among groups (Jonckheere trend test,
Mann–Whitney U test with Bonferroni correction). Quali-
tative methodology, such as direct observation and informal
interviews (Russell-Bernard, 2006), were used to support the
interpretation of questionnaire results with a proper under-
standing of any local dynamics that could affect the choices
and perceptions of respondents. In our case, qualitative meth-
ods were employed after the questionnaire interviews had
been conducted. Field notes were developed during the in-
terviews, or immediately after, and were consolidated on a
daily basis, while in some cases, in agreement with respon-
dent, the “comment” space of the questionnaire was used.
4 Results
This section describes the results of our research. First, we
provide a short contextualization of the analysis (demograph-
ics, perceived level of preparedness and structural mitigation
measures), where we focus on information and experience
intended as central aspects that can influence the capacity
to react to warning systems. Second, we present the specific
results for the alert siren and the SMS warning service and
correlate them with the contextual drivers.
4.1 Context, information and experience
In total, 228 questionnaires were completed. The majority
of them (73 %) were self-administered. Some 54 % of the
respondents were males and 45 % were females. The av-
erage age was 40.2 years (SD± 14.3). Participants had a
medium level of education, as 25 % of them had a middle-
school diploma, 62 % had a high-school diploma and 13 %
a degree. Some 31 % owned a business near the seaside,
while 46 % worked in related activities. Finally, 45 % lived
near the seaside. Respondents did not feel adequately pre-
pared to cope with flood risk (M = 4), but they felt signifi-
cantly more able to protect themselves and their families dur-
ing a hypothetical event (Mdn= 5), z=−4.18, p< 0.001.
These variables were also positively correlated, rs = 0.63,
p< 0.001. Structural protection barriers were generally eval-
uated to be insufficiently effective, and this is likely to be
influenced by the perception of local flood history of the
interviewees. In particular, this applied to the new harbour
gates (M = 3.58, SD± 2.52) and the submerged barriers
(M = 4.23, SD± 2.44). Similarly, the transverse rocky bar-
riers (M = 4.43, SD± 2.38) and sand nourishment were not
considered sufficient (M = 5.02, SD= 2.65).
The interviewees did not feel adequately informed about
flood risk in Cesenatico (M = 4.3, SD± 2.70). Nevertheless,
the more the respondents felt informed, the more they tend
to consider themselves prepared to face a flood (rs = 0.40,
p< 0.001) and to take care of their families during such an
event (rs = 0.34, p< 0.001). Even though only a minority of
them (14 %) made no effort to search for information about
flooding, the results highlight a lack of direct official commu-
nication from the authorities and put the level of education
and training activities in the community as almost irrelevant.
Indeed, only 11 % of respondents reported the port author-
ity’s advice as their only source of information, and it was as-
sociated to other sources by a further 6 % (i.e. 17 % depended
to some extent on it). The role of drills as information sources
was noted only by 1 % of the respondents. Instead of focus-
ing on a single communication channel for the dissemination
process, the need to use many different sources was poorly
appreciated, and respondents variously relied on the Internet
(13 %), word of mouth (12 %), newspapers (10 %), television
(5 %) and other means (5 %). Some 30 % of all participants
used two or more sources together, and this reached only
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44 % if only people searching for information are consid-
ered. Only 38 % were aware of possible routes and methods
of evacuation, while 62 % were unaware. Informal interviews
highlighted the lack of training and information provided by
the authorities to local citizens, as the only preparedness ac-
tivity associated with the municipality and the civil protec-
tion service was the occasional distribution of tide calendars.
Furthermore, the need for training was strongly perceived by
shopkeepers, especially in the area near the Porto Canale:
here the effects of floods are most frequent and training was
perceived as a way to reduce damages.
Slightly more than half of participants (54 %) had direct
experience of flooding. These had suffered only moderate
economic damage (M = 5.6, SD± 3.39), with higher rates of
perceived disruption (M = 6.1, SD± 3). Moreover, respon-
dents who had already experienced a flood claimed to be
more informed about the problem (Mdn= 5) than were other
participants in the survey (Mdn= 3, U = 5132, p< 0.05,
r = 0.14). Informal interviews revealed that economic dam-
age consisted, for example, of wasted goods in shops and
restaurants and, in one case, a car that was swept into the
canal harbour. The disruption was slightly higher in events
that blocked people’s normal routines, even among those
who were located relatively far from the areas of greatest
and more frequent flooding. Low levels of institutional sup-
port were highlighted (M = 3.2, SD± 2.35). In particular in
the shops of the town centre, people pointed out the absence
of economic support for those who had experienced damage,
while it was surprising to hear in a small town that authorities
were not perceived as active, for example they did not have
much direct contact with people before or after critical peri-
ods. Furthermore, these data are in line with the overall per-
ception of responses to flooding. Those of the port authority
were judged inadequate (M = 4.8, SD± 2.85), as were those
of the civil protection and municipality (M = 4.9, SD± 3)
and the emergency medical services (M = 5.4, SD± 2.76).
In contrast, fire fighters were considered to have been ef-
fective in floods (M = 6.2, SD± 2.88). Informal interviews
made an interesting point about the intervention of the civil
protection service, as volunteers were perceived as “good
people, willing to help others” but constant problems of co-
ordination were attributed to failures in the municipal gov-
ernment.
Respondents with past experience of floods claimed
to be significantly more prepared to cope with a future
event (Mdn= 4, U = 5037, p< 0.05, r =−0.15) and signif-
icantly more able to protect their families (Mdn= 5) com-
pared with people with no experience (Mdn= 3, Mdn= 4,
U = 4977.5, p< 0.05, r =−0.16). A positive relationship
was found between how much people felt they were sup-
ported by institutions and the perceived level of infor-
mation received (rs = 0.2, p< 0.05) and their prepared-
ness for flooding (rs = 0.22, p< 0.05). A Mann–Whitney
Test revealed that respondents who knew about evacuation
routes were more informed about flooding risk (U = 3553,
Table 1. Visual output of the key variables.
Variable Mean Standard
value deviation
(SD)
Information 4.3 ±2.70
Preparedness 4 ±2.72
Economic damages 5.6 ±3.39
Disruption 6.1 ±3
Institutional support 3.2 ±2.35
p< 0.0001, r =−0.28) and felt more supported by the insti-
tutions (U = 1110.5, p< 0.005, r =−0.27). However, these
characteristics were not associated with the experience of
previous events. This evidence is of particular interest in our
research, as at the time of the interviews the municipality of
Cesenatico did not have an evacuation plan. According to the
informal interviews, the most informed people were likely be
more aware of the correct way to leave town. We can also
argue that, as no plan was actually implemented by the mu-
nicipal government, only people who felt more supported by
the institutions were likely to have received direct informa-
tion about unofficial escape routes. However, this explanation
cannot be considered as satisfactory, and those particular dy-
namics should be verified by further, more focused research.
Table 1 summarizes in graphical output the key values about
information and experience that emerged in this part.
4.2 An in-depth analysis of warning systems: the alert
siren and the SMS warning service in Cesenatico
The first warning service to be analysed is the flood
alert siren activated by the municipal government. During
their lifetimes, respondents heard it on average four times
(SD± 4.21; mode= 0) but nearly one-third (34 %) of re-
spondents had never heard it. A Mann–Whitney test veri-
fied that people who had experienced floods appeared to have
heard the siren much more often (Mdn= 5) than people who
had never had such an experience (Mdn= 0, U = 3549.5,
p< 0.001, r = 0.39). However, hearing the flood alert siren
was not correlated with risk perception, receipt of infor-
mation, support by institutions or level of damage and
discomfort. The number of times the siren was heard is
weakly correlated with overall information levels (rs = 0.27,
p< 0.001), preparation (rs = 0.24, p< 0.001) and ability to
protect oneself and one’s family (rs = 0.19, p< 0.01). Cit-
izens who lived near the beach (Mdn= 4) heard the siren
more often than others did (Mdn= 2, U = 4093.5, p< 0.05,
r =−0.18).
The three most common reactions after hearing its sound
were to warn other people (29 %), to search for further
information (23 %) and to activate measures for the pro-
tection of property (21 %). A substantial 18 % of respon-
dents did nothing, while small numbers (3 %) took shelter
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Table 2. Actions taken after hearing the alert siren.
Action % of
respondents
Warning of others 29
Research information 23
Measures of protection 21
Did nothing 18
Shelter 3
Evacuate 2
and prepared to evacuate (2 %). Table 2 provides a graphic
overview of the reactions to the alert siren. The behaviour
chosen after hearing the sound of the warning is not ex-
plained by perception of risk, information, level of sup-
port from institutions and level of damage or discomfort.
However, a Kruskal–Wallis test revealed a significant differ-
ence in level of preparation to cope with a flood in relation
to other actions taken after hearing the siren (H (1)= 9.49,
p< 0.01). A Mann–Whitney test with a Bonferroni correc-
tion (α= 0.017), performed as a follow-up to this result,
showed that people who engaged in self-protective behaviour
(Mdn= 4) felt more able to cope with flooding compared to
those who engaged in passive behaviour (Mdn= 1, U = 293,
p< 0.005, r = 0.36). Furthermore, people who engaged in
passive behaviour (Mdn= 1) considered themselves less pre-
pared to face flooding with respect to people who were active
(Mdn= 4, U = 986, p< 0.05, r = 0.2). There is no associa-
tion between the extent to which people felt supported by in-
stitutions and the actions they took after they heard the siren.
No differences related to gender or age were found.
Informal interviews verified the existence of an infor-
mal dissemination channel integrated into the official one,
namely groups of people that took it upon themselves to
warn people. As searching for information is a natural in-
stinct in disasters, various shopkeepers who activated mea-
sures of self-protection, such as the installation of mobile
bulkheads or placing goods in higher places, reported the
need for training on possible alternative protection strate-
gies. Finally, among the citizens who did nothing, some of
their shortage of motivation was related to lack of knowledge
about possible measures, a lack of knowledge of the risks or,
in one case, the belief that “when you hear the siren, the wa-
ter has already arrived.” A different explanation can be found
for low rates of evacuation, which may be a function of rel-
atively low danger of flooding in terms of loss of life, but it
also responds to the absence of a formal evacuation plan for
Cesenatico.
Observations of a more general kind concern the alert
via SMS. In our case, the service was complementary to
the alert siren and was intended to balance its limitations.
However, its existence was known by much fewer citizens
than those who stated that they had heard the siren at least
5%	  
19%	  
76%	  
Know	  the	  service	  and	  
subscribed	  
Know	  the	  service	  
Don't	  know	  the	  service	  
Figure 3. Knowledge of the SMS warning service in Cesenatico.
once in their lives (Fig. 3). SMS warning services were
known by only 20 % of all respondents, of whom only a
small minority (5 %) had subscribed to the service. Even if
80 % of them had never heard of it, most of the respondents
rated the alert as generally useful (M = 7.3, SD± 2.68).
Despite this, there is a significant difference among age
groups (G1= 18–35; G2= 36–55; G3= 55+; H (1)= 8.71,
p< 0.05). G1 (Mdn= 7) rated the alert less useful com-
pared to G3 (Mdn= 9, U = 234, p<Bonferroni correction
α= 0.017, r =−0.36). Moreover, a Jonckheere test revealed
a significant ascending trend in the median values across
the three age groups (G1= 7; G2= 8; G3= 9; J = 3146,
z= 2.86, p< 0.005).
During informal interviews, a couple of citizens stated that
the dissemination of news about the service was ineffective,
which is what appears in the quantitative data set. Whether
the system was rated as useful was not influenced by knowl-
edge of the service itself, and these data highlight a clear
failure in the dissemination process, from which other possi-
ble inferences can be derived using by statistical analysis.
There is a significant association between knowing about
the alert warning system and having experienced a flood
(χ2(1)= 4.53, p< 0.05, 8= 0.16). This corresponds to the
belief that respondents who had experienced a flood event
were more than 2 times more likely to know the system than
those who had not. In addition, interviewees who knew about
the system felt significantly more informed (Mdn= 5) than
the others did (Mdn= 4, U = 2420, p< 0.005, r = 0.21) and
felt more supported by institutions (Mdn= 4) than the others
(Mdn= 3, U = 935.5, p< 0.05, r = 0.19).
The relations between variables and the knowledge of
SMS warning system were investigated by independent
t tests and by chi-square ratio. Three main categories of vari-
ables (socio-demographic, information and preparedness and
past experiences) were used to consider the possible influ-
ences of the individual and community dimensions in rela-
tion to our literature review. Most results of the t test were
not significant and the levels of chi-square have a high proba-
bility of random answers for each variable considered. How-
ever, the relationship between knowledge of the SMS warn-
ing service and previous experience of flooding is confirmed,
and this could be related to different levels of risk awareness.
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A further test was used to verify this relationship. Knowledge
of the SMS alert system seemed to be affected by the num-
ber of times people heard the siren (U = 2652.5, p< 0.01,
r = 0.19). Respondents who knew the system (Mdn= 7) had
heard the siren more often than those who did not (Mdn= 2).
Higher levels of perceived institutional support among flood
victims are slightly related to knowledge of the SMS warning
system, as trust can influence a citizen’s decision to subscribe
to the public service or pay attention to municipal initiatives
in general. Finally, information levels are confirmed as influ-
encing average scores and their relationship with knowledge
of the warning system.
The values attributed to the perceived utility of the SMS
warning service in Cesenatico are correlated to the main vari-
ables that have been used to verify knowledge. Most fac-
tors seem to be independent, but there are only weak cor-
relations with age and information levels. Evidence seems
to confirm that even if the community generally perceives a
service to be useful, actions on information, education and
involvement need to be taken to convert a technical instru-
ment into an effective piece of machinery for citizens. Fi-
nally, a Mann–Whitney test disclosed that respondents who
knew about evacuation routes heard the siren more often
(U = 4456, p< 0.05, r =−0.13) than those who did not. No
association was found between the knowledge of evacuation
routes, knowledge of the SMS alert system and the behaviour
adopted after having heard the siren. Similarly, no statisti-
cally significant correlation was found between knowledge of
the SMS warning system, its perceived utility and perception
of the effectiveness of structural measures (harbour gates,
submerged barriers, rocky cliffs and beach nourishment).
5 Discussion
In this section we discuss the results of our research. Findings
are compared with existing literature to provide new critical
points for scholars to consider. The focus will be on how ex-
perience and information can be related with alert services,
as we will consider them key aspects that could influence the
effectiveness of warnings. Please note that risk perception
will be included in the discussion, but further research about
its relations with alert services could be desirable.
5.1 Context, information and experience
The low perceived effectiveness of structural mitigation mea-
sures is likely to be determined by the local flood history,
where events were recurrent despite the technical solution
adopted. Similarly, the perception of economic damages and
disruptions are in line with the ones expected from the de-
scription of floods risk in Cesenatico. Low levels of prepared-
ness are related to information, which is a clear driver that de-
termines the effectiveness of non-structural mitigation mea-
sures at large (Lindell et al., 2007). The relationship between
knowledge of evacuation routes and levels of preparedness
revealed by our results can be compared with similar ev-
idence, associated with high levels of worry, obtained by
Bradford et al. (2012), who interviewed people in Belgium,
Finland, Germany, Ireland and Italy (n= 1231). Regarding
information and preparedness, their research had similar re-
sults to ours, as only 34 % of their participants considered
themselves prepared for future floods. Bradford et al. (2012)
also suggested that the authorities should increase confidence
by providing specific information on which practical mitiga-
tion measures need to be adopted by citizens. In our opinion,
the different values attributed to information sources demon-
strate that no single channel of communication is likely to
reach all people and, in any case, it will have to be integrated
with word-of-mouth communication (Alexander, 2002).
We argue that in our case study the total absence of drills
was particularly critical. Villagrán de León (2012) suggested
that drills and exercises involving all components of warn-
ings and all stakeholders are a critical means of identify-
ing additional gaps, increasing awareness of how the system
works and improving interactions among people within and
external to the communities. Similarly, the data set analysed
by Salit et al. (2013) seems to suggest that in many cases
information could be improved by advice on how to behave
in a crisis situation. Our other findings about experience and
floods are in line with the literature, which generally recog-
nizes the relationship between experience and perceived vul-
nerability (Lara et al., 2010). The use of specific questions
about flood warning allows us to discuss other correlations
between information, preparedness and non-structural miti-
gation measures.
5.2 The alert siren and the SMS warning service in
Cesenatico
The data about the alert siren verified the results of Alexan-
der (2002): the siren is a simple instrument that has the ben-
efit of immediacy and can be used both during daytime and
at night but can also be easily ignored, not heard or misinter-
preted. Alert sirens have localized effects that may depend on
contextual factors that can prevent people from hearing them,
for example due to a citizen’s activities or his or her level of
awareness. Moreover, our data provide further evidence for
discussion. The first point to analyse is what the behaviour
related to the alert siren may really signify. Positive or con-
structive reactions are more common than in many other
cases recently defined in other contexts, such as in Romania,
where about 52 % of people took some kind of action after
the reception of a warning (Salit et al., 2013). The high lev-
els of social capital could be a possible explanation for this,
because its influence could be also be related to the existence
of informal dissemination channels through which particu-
lar groups warn people. As our background data were scarce
in that direction, further research should investigate these as-
pects more thoroughly. Instead, other reactions reflect com-
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mon responses such as the sealing up of certain structures to
keep water out (Smith and Petley, 2009). The high propor-
tion of people who search for information after hearing the
siren reflects the fact that citizens’ behaviour is orientated by
specific knowledge about the event and by access to informa-
tion about measures of protection that emphasize how to use
the time gained by warning in order to produce an effective
response, while in other cases insecurity and stress may limit
the ability to react (Parker et al., 2007). The effectiveness of
warning is better when people have more detailed knowledge
about self-protection measures that they can undertake as a
pre-condition for action (Thieken et al., 2007).
It is interesting to compare our results with the study by
Fielding et al. (2007), which used a list of actions and cat-
egories to illustrate the different levels of flood warning in
the UK (flood watch, flood warning and severe flood warn-
ing). When “flood warning” is considered, 44 % of respon-
dents would undertake measures related to the protection of
property, 42 % would prepare to evacuate and 10 % would
do nothing or would not know what to do. Warning and
helping others would be undertaken by 8 % of respondents.
When actions in “severe flood warning” situations are con-
sidered, 63 % of respondents reported that they would pre-
pare to evacuate or safeguard people and animals. Fewer than
10 % would warn or help others, while 6 % would do nothing.
This evidence highlights the particular role of positive be-
haviour in Cesenatico, as we observed three kinds of answers
related to “warning others” that are likely to be related to the
existence of informal warning channels and specific cultural
patterns that are probably a function of social capital. Con-
flicting results on evacuation are likely to be a function of dif-
ferent local flood histories but are also related to the absence
of evacuation plans. Similar forms of inaction can be found in
both our data and the study by Fielding et al. (2007), mostly
at the “flood warning” level. Our data offer a particular point
of view on the debate about the relation between risk per-
ception and adoption of preparedness measures. On the one
hand, some authors associate high levels of risk perception
with the adoption of precautionary measures and positive be-
haviour, for example in work on information sources (Miceli
et al., 2008). On the other hand, research points out that
flood risk awareness does not necessarily imply the adoption
of protection measures (Burningham et al., 2008). Our data
tend to show that positive behaviour is present in the search
for information and the activation of particular protection
measures. Similarly, the existence of informal dissemination
channels for warnings, cross-checked with the presence of
social capital, refers a social situation that could respond to
stimulation. A critical element that could orient this attitude
is one defined by O’Sullivan et al. (2012) according to whom
flood information is usually disseminated on a top-down ba-
sis, offering little opportunity for the overall reception of con-
structive feedback from end users. These negative factors are
likely to reduce institutional trust, as reciprocity is related to
perceived accountability. Similarly, Parker and Priest (2012)
suggested that further progress is needed in order to increase
trust-building partnerships throughout the chain of warning,
while wider community and individual engagement are still
critical elements that need improvement, whatever the tech-
nology used.
Our results seem to support the assertion that no differ-
ences in reaction exist among genders or age groups, de-
spite Parker and Priest’s (2012) discussion of other studies
that show such things. The results reported by Fielding et
al. (2007) show similar intentions of males and females, but
men were regarded as more likely to undertake positive be-
haviour, such as preventing the ingress of water, and woman
were more likely to seek further information. We found no
correlation between age groups and actions, while Fielding
et al. (2007) noted that the youngest and oldest age groups
tended to have a lesser assessment of risk and to take fewer
actions.
Different evidence emerges from data on the SMS warn-
ing service. The result shows that the development of tech-
nical instruments is not sufficient in itself to create a good
warning if the population is not involved and the service is
not tailored to the characteristics and culture of the commu-
nity. On the one hand, our data verify what has already been
shown by Kreibich et al. (2007). Warnings can be consid-
ered favourably even when they do not reach a large portion
of the citizenry. On the other hand, we show that the utility
of warnings is independent of the perceived effectiveness of
structural measures and also of demographic elements such
as age. Similarly, Parker et al. (2009) suggested that to have
a positive impact, technological advancement depends on the
adoption of shared considerations among flood managers and
communities regarding the behavioural aspects of the warn-
ing process. Inclusive management and governance is funda-
mental, as it increases trust in agencies and develops mes-
sages focused on local needs, experiences and communica-
tion modes. Missing an appropriate opportunity for dissem-
ination is thus a critical point that has the potential to waste
the benefits derived from the development of a warning sys-
tem. The statistical relations between the SMS warning and
alert siren could be related to the complementary role of the
services but also to other elements. Indeed, the presence of
the acoustic signal can increase risk perception, while its lo-
cation may require a higher presence of emergency person-
nel (e.g. civil protection operatives) and in general a greater
presence on the ground of representatives of the main local
institutions.
6 Conclusions
Our case study shows in detail how different experiences and
information provide an essential background that enables us
to understand the critical interactions that affect warning ser-
vices. We registered the presence of common failures that
can be related to how vulnerability is treated in society. Even
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if we assume that forecasting problems exist, as shown in
the literature (Llasat and Siccardi, 2010), we found that the
contextualization of warnings can critically modify the ef-
fects of the technical instruments upon the community. We
believe that many relationships present points of interest for
scholars, but we would like to highlight the following points
in particular:
– Lack of information seems to play a crucial role in de-
termining the local lack of preparedness. Citizens that
experienced previous floods were more informed but
also accorded low values to the emergency responses of
the municipal government and civil protection services.
Similarly, the possible evacuation roads were associated
with individual preparedness more than with the collec-
tive equivalent. We argue that a lack of drills could be a
determinant of such patterns and that they reveal a lack
of communication between the authorities and local cit-
izens.
– We found that the first reactions to the alert siren dif-
fered from what the literature usually associates with
warnings. The number of respondents who warn oth-
ers is significantly higher, while evacuation values are
lower. These elements can be related to specific lo-
cal features, such as the existence of informal warning
channels, the nature of recurring floods and probably
also the absence of evacuation plans, but they are not
related to the perception of level of support by local in-
stitutions during floods. We argue for the influence of
social capital, but further research is needed in order
better to understand this particular point.
– No difference in gender and age influenced the reactions
to the alert siren, but age was correlated with the per-
ceived utility of the SMS warning service.
– Warning services, such as an SMS, may be perceived as
very useful even if they are not tested. In fact, the lit-
erature attributes importance to the existence of warn-
ings in their own right. However, our data highlight the
contrast between high utility levels and critical failures
in the dissemination process that can seriously compro-
mize the role of technical services.
– We found evidence of positive behaviour, such as the
search for information and activation of particular flood
prevention measures. However, their effectiveness may
be limited by the absence of specific training, such as
drills.
Our data set has limitations, but it does not seem to invali-
date our results. It may include an occasional lack of rigour,
for example in our inability to compute a response rate for the
completion of questionnaires, while informal interviews and
direct observation may add to this problem. Some concerns
are related to the collection of data in two different periods,
2011 and 2012, but we used the statistical analysis to show
that no significant differences exist between the two data sets.
To sum up, our case study shows that the effectiveness of
warnings can be related to how they are developed in the
community rather more than to the technical elements alone.
Warnings can be perceived as effective technical solutions,
but nevertheless the dimensions of information, training and
involvement may be missing. From our data, we argue that
the community tries to increase its preparedness by access-
ing information, but the authorities do not support this pro-
cess with concrete practices, or simply do not do so properly.
This could be related to cultural patterns and to the particu-
lar floods that occur in the Adriatic Sea, but other research
should test our results in different case studies around the
Mediterranean.
For the moment, we simply confirm the evidence provided
by Kelman (2001): the stimulation of comprehensive educa-
tion on natural hazards, local risks and effective protection
actions are necessary to produce effective changes in citi-
zens’ ways of living and to improve comprehensive flood
management. In the future, scholars should further investi-
gate the relationship between perceived low levels of insti-
tutional support and the absence of training processes, as
well as the missing dimension of perceived accountability.
These points are particularly critical in the Mediterranean
area, where culture and the accountability of institutions are
sensibly different from what they are in central and north-
ern Europe. Similarly, our case study suggests the need for a
wider analysis of how policies, politics, social capital and ef-
fective deployment of warning systems interact. Even if flood
warnings should involve new procedures to include the com-
munity and increase the effectiveness of dissemination pro-
cess, this may not be enough without a wider reflection on
how to ensure the accountability of flood management. This
could be a critical issue not only for providing effective an-
swers to the population’s needs but also for the creation of a
new culture that is able to maximize technical advancements
and create wider social progress in effective disaster risk re-
duction.
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